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It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms 
of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. 
Using Cohen’s evaluative conservatism as my starting point, I argue that there are 
strong conservative reasons to prioritise the development of biomedical enhancements. 
In particular, I suggest that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to 
maintain our current evaluative equilibrium (i.e. the set of values that undergird and 
permeate our current political, economic, and personal lives) against the threats to that 
equilibrium posed by external, non-biomedical forms of enhancement. I defend this 
view against modest conservatives who insist that biomedical enhancements pose a 
greater risk to our current evaluative equilibrium, and against those who see no 
principled distinction between the forms of human enhancement. 
 
It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human 
  
 1. Introduction 
 Conservatives like things the way they are; enhancement technologies allow us to 
change them. It is no surprise then that there is a widespread belief that conservative 
moral principles lead to the rejection of human enhancement. In this article, I argue that 
this widespread belief is wrong in a number of critical respects. I argue that the 
promotion of biomedical human enhancement could be crucial if we are to conserve our 
current evaluative equilibrium against an array of technological threats. I defend this 
argument in four parts. First, I situate my argument within both the conservative moral 
tradition and the enhancement debate. Second, I present and clarify the argument itself. 
Third, I defend the central premise of the argument, noting three specific ways in which 
biomedical enhancement could help to preserve our current evaluative equilibrium. And 
finally, I respond to six objections to this argument. 
 
 
 2. Enhancement and Evaluative Conservatism 
 It is important to clarify the style of conservatism adopted throughout the 
remainder of the article and to explain how the argument I defend it is situated relative 
to other, somewhat similar, arguments.  
 
 Conservatism is a rich philosophical tradition. My argument draws on a thin, but 
core, version of this tradition. The version has two components: an evaluative one and 
an epistemic one. The evaluative component maintains that we should seek to hold onto 
or preserve existing sources of value even if we are promised newer better sources of 
value in their stead. This evaluative conservatism is taken from the work of Jerry 
Cohen.[1, 2] Cohen’s conservatism holds that there is reason to favour an existing 
source of value (V1) over a potential/future value (V2), even if there is also reason to 
suspect that the (expected) value of V2 would be greater than V1. An example helps.[3] 
Suppose you currently have a pet dog – call him Fido. You have established a deep and 
affectionate relationship with Fido. One day someone offers you a new dog – call him 
Rex. You are assured (and you believe) that you could have an even deeper and more 
affectionate relationship with Rex, but only if you give up Fido. Presented with such a 
choice, many people would hang onto Fido. Why? Because they are evaluative 
conservatives: They wish to continue to value that which is valuable and valued by 
  
them,1 partly because the thing is itself a source of value and partly because of the 
personal and/or cultural history they associate with that source of value. In other words, 
they want to hold onto existing sources of value because of how those sources figure in 
their personal and cultural identity, in preference to alternative and arguably better 
sources of value. My conservative case for biomedical enhancement works from this 
evaluative form of conservatism. It maintains that we should favour biomedical 
enhancement because doing so will help us to preserve existing personal, social and 
political sources of values that are currently under threat. In doing so, it also appeals to 
our personal and cultural attachment to these sources of value.2 
 
 In addition to the evaluative component, I include an epistemic component in the 
conservative stance adopted in this article. This helps to situate my argument within the 
popular Burkean tradition of conservatism.[4] This form of conservatism is sceptical of 
change on the grounds that existing social arrangements can embody a degree of 
distributed knowledge that is difficult to make accessible to conscious awareness and 
deliberation, and hence there is significant evaluative risk in seeking to change from 
these existing arrangements. In this sense, the argument presented could be linked with 
the concerns expressed in debates about the role of moral risk in practical reason, 
though I will not spell out those links in what follows.[5-8] The epistemic component is 
relevant because although Cohen’s evaluative conservatism works even in a situation in 
which we know for sure that the future source of value will be better than what we 
currently have, it seems more realistic to assume that we make our moral choices in the 
face of risk and uncertainty.  
 
 I make no further conservative commitments in this article. I would suggest, 
though I will not defend this suggestion, that the evaluative and epistemic components 
that I have identified represent the core of most forms of political and moral 
conservatism. But to this core additional commitments are often added. For instance, 
bioconservatives often make strong assumptions about the fixity and imperfections of 
human nature/biology and the desirability of a natural order.[9] I deliberately eschew 
                                                            
1 Pugh et al [3] discuss the distinction between valuing the valuable and valuing the valued. The former is 
about intrinsic value; the latter is about personal history with the source of value.  
2 A reviewer pointed out that evaluative conservatism could have paradoxical consequences. What if, for 
example, one currently values constant change? If so, then one would constantly favour changes to the 
existing status quo, which hardly seems conservative. Interestingly this is a criticism of enhancement that 
some modest conservatives develop (e.g. Hauskeller 2011). This might be a logically permissible but it 
seems unlikely that anyone espousing a conservative moral outlook would favour this view hence I ignore 
it in what follows. 
  
those commitments here. I do so for two reasons. The first is that these thicker and more 
traditional forms of conservatism have been widely defended and critiqued already in 
the debate about human enhancement.[9-11] The thinner and more modest forms of 
conservatism are more novel and underexplored. Second, the thinner form of 
conservatism is arguably more formidable: by being modest in its conservative 
commitments it tries to show how conservative values can appeal across the political 
and moral spectrum. Cohen, for instance, was no political conservative but he found 
evaluative conservatism appealing. 
 
  Proponents of this thinner form of evaluative conservatism have used it argue 
against human enhancement technologies. Cohen believed, and others have agreed, that 
evaluative conservatism provided powerful reasons to oppose enhancement.[3] 
Likewise, recent anti-enhancement authors such as Nicholas Agar and Michael 
Hauskeller,[12-15] although not explicitly calling themselves conservatives, have 
challenged the enhancement project on the grounds that it threatens existing sources of 
value. Agar worries that enhancement technologies prioritise hypothetical external 
goods over existing internal (and species-specific) goods. Hauskeller explicitly laments 
the fact that enhancement favours the possible better over the existing good.[14] My 
goal in this article is to suggest that evaluative conservatism actually provides powerful 
reasons to favour human enhancement. It does so because enhancement can help us to 
preserve much of what is currently valuable about our way of life. 
 
 This basic insight is not novel. Pugh, Kahane, and Savulescu[3] have pointed out 
that Cohen’s conservatism can be used to defend some forms of enhancement. For 
instance, they argue that life extension therapy can be defended on the grounds that it 
preserves the value that attaches to our current lives and, similarly, mood enhancement 
drugs can be defended on the grounds that they allow us to preserve the value of 
existing interpersonal relationships.  Buchanan makes similar claims, pointing out that 
‘[t]o avoid losing some of the good things we now enjoy, we will have to enhance 
ourselves in particular ways’ ([11], p. 163). But none of these authors develops the 
conservative case beyond a mere suggestion. They shine a light down a possible 
pathway; they do not lead us to the end. That’s what I want to do in what follows. I 
want to argue that evaluative conservatism can lead to the view that biomedical 
enhancement is close to an axiological imperative: something we must pursue lest we 
  
lose much of what is currently valuable (and valued by us) in our political, economic 
and personal lives.  
 
 
 3. The Evaluative Conservative Argument 
 So the argument is that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to 
conserve our current evaluative equilibrium. This argument appeals to a number of 
controversial concepts, each of which needs to be clarified.  
 
 I start with the most obvious point of contention: the idea of enhancement itself. 
There are two prominent approaches to the definition of enhancement in the 
literature.[16 – 20] There is the functionalist approach, which holds that an intervention 
counts as an enhancement if it improves (or adds to) the functionality of a human being 
relative to some population-level (or species-level) norm.[9] And there is the welfarist 
approach which holds that an intervention counts as an enhancement if it increases the 
chances of someone living a good life, relative to their current circumstances.[16] The 
argument I defend works best with the functionalist definition, though it will also work 
with the welfarist definition, provided that the ‘good life’ is understood to include more 
than simply subjective well-being and, in particular, to include some sense of personal 
achievement, mastery and understanding.  
 
 The second point of contention is the focus on biomedical forms of enhancement. 
As Buchanan[9] notes, enhancement is a broad concept and could refer to interventions 
as diverse as farming, democratic governance, literacy, education, pharmacological 
drugs, brain stimulation, and neuroprosthetic devices. Some people insist that there are 
no principled distinctions between these forms of enhancement.[21] Others insist that 
there are.[22] In this article, I use the descriptor ‘biomedical’ to designate enhancement 
technologies that either directly target (e.g. pharmacological drugs) or directly integrate 
with (e.g. neuroprosthetics) our human biology. They are to be contrasted with external 
and automating technologies, which often make our lives easier, may indirectly increase 
our power to change the world around us, and so could also be said to have an 
enhancing effect. I will insist that there is an important distinction between the two 
types of technological intervention when it comes to the conservation of value. 
 
  
 This brings me to the third and final point of contention, which relates to my 
claim that biomedical enhancement can conserve our current evaluative equilibrium. I 
appeal to this concept in order to incorporate Cohen’s evaluative conservative principles 
into my argumentative framework. I define ‘evaluative equilibrium’, loosely, to mean 
the set of values that undergirds and permeates our current way of life. In what follows, 
I particularly appeal to the set of values that undergird the dominant Western political 
and economic systems, and those that support our sense of personal achievement and 
satisfaction. Evaluative conservatism then enters the picture as an attempt to defend that 
current evaluative equilibrium in lieu of alternative evaluative equilibria promised or 
predicted by certain technological enthusiasts (even if those evaluative equilibria 
promise to be better). I appreciate that this notion of a readily identifiable evaluative 
equilibrium is questionable, but I hope to add some reasonably specific content to it 
below. 
 
 This brings us to the argument itself, which can be formulated like this: 
 
(1) We ought to maintain our current set of values (VS1) over a potential/future 
set of values (VS2…VSn), even if those future sets of values are potentially 
superior. 
 
(2) Prioritising biomedical enhancement can help us to maintain VS1 and stave off 
threats to VS1 posed by other technological developments. 
 
(3) Therefore, we ought to prioritise biomedical enhancement. 
 
There is an unavoidable degree of empirical uncertainty in premise (2).3 This is why the 
argument talks about how biomedical enhancement ‘can help’ rather than ‘will help’, 
and why the conclusion is framed in terms of ‘prioritisation’ not actual use. 
Nevertheless, the argument defends a reasonably strong view about the value of 
biomedical enhancement. It claims that the development of biomedical enhancement 
technologies could be a moral imperative due to the threat to our current evaluative 
equilibrium that is posed by other technological developments. Hence, it is not simply 
that biomedical enhancement is desirable or preferable. The strength of this should 
become clearer in the next section. 
                                                            
3 On the role of empirical uncertainty in the enhancement debate see Loi [23]. 
  
 
 For the purposes of this argument, I assume that the conservative principle stated 
in premise (1) is correct. Readers will need to go elsewhere for its defence.[1-3] My 
focus thus switches to the defence of premise (2). I defend that over the remaining two 
sections of the article. 
 
 4. The Threat of Externalisation to our Evaluative Equilibrium 
 Proponents and opponents of enhancement often consider the ethical implications 
of enhancement technologies in isolation from other technological and social trends.4 
Thus, for example, they might consider the impact of cognitive enhancement drugs 
among university students against the more or less static socio-normative background of 
contemporary (often Anglo-American) universities. This allows them to identify ways 
in which the use of such drugs may be desirable or undesirable, given that background. 
But it does not enable them to consider how the use of such drugs may fit into an 
evolving and ever-changing model of university life. The central theme of my argument 
is that this sort of static ethical analysis is a mistake. When considering the ethical 
implications of biomedical enhancement, we must take into account the dynamic and 
ever-changing socio-technical background in which such enhancements are likely to 
develop. It is when we do this that we see most clearly the conservative value of such 
technologies. 
 
 This means that the first thing we need to do in order to defend premise (2) is to 
consider the background of other technological changes against which the assessment of 
biomedical enhancement must take place. It is impossible to provide a complete 
description of that background, but we can at least highlight some of its most salient 
features. I would argue that the biggest and most important feature of that background is 
the rapid growth in computerisation, artificial intelligence, machine learning, robotics 
and other types of information technology. I don’t view this as a particularly 
controversial claim. The growth in these technologies is readily transparent. It has been 
exponential for much of the past 60 years and some are convinced that this exponential 
growth will continue, and will have spillover effects as ICT ‘infects’ other technological 
developments.[24-26] There are three important manifestations of this trend (i) the rise 
                                                            
4 Some discussions do not omit this point. A good example is the work of Persson and Savulescu [63] on 
moral enhancement, which is explicitly framed in terms of broader climatological and technological 
changes. 
  
of automating technologies in agricultural, manufacturing, professional, and service-
related work;[27-30] (ii) the increasing use of data-mining and other automated 
decision-making technologies in governance systems;[31, 32] and (iii) the use of digital 
assistants and robot helpers in our personal lives.[32, 33] My claim is that these three 
technological developments pose a threat to our current evaluative equilibrium. Once 
we see this, we can see the conservative potential of biomedical enhancements. It is best 
to do this by addressing the threats individually. 
 
 I start with the economic threat. Most Western societies are characterised by 
mixed economic systems in which the government provides legal and administrative 
support for a system of private capitalistic enterprise. Most people are employed (or 
hope to be employed) within that system. These employments are a significant source of 
value to the individuals being employed and to society more generally. It is how goods 
and services get distributed to those who need or desire them. It is how individuals 
secure the economic rewards that make life possible and pleasurable. Many people tie 
their self-worth and self-actualisation to their success in their working lives, and are 
then socially evaluated on the basis of this success. Welfare systems provide some sort 
of safety-net, but this is usually insufficient and typically tied to the ability to work. 
Furthermore, welfare systems do not compensate for the non-monetary goods of work. 
As Ghaeus and Herzog have recently argued, work is a privileged context for the 
attaintment of goods such as excellence/mastery, social contribution, sense of 
community and social status.[34] As such, working for economic reward forms a 
significant part of our current evaluative equilibrium. The problem with the rise of 
automation technologies is that they threaten to undermine this system of values. An 
increasing number authors are convinced that these technologies will displace much of 
the current workforce, thereby depriving them of this source of value.[27, 28] 
Furthermore, even those who are not convinced by the strong technological 
unemployment thesis seem to agree that automating technologies change the types of 
work that are available, making low-paid, precarious, but difficult-to-automate work 
more common.[35] Others even go so far as to draw the connection between this trend 
and the enhancement debate and argue that technological unemployment is likely to 
have a ‘disenhancing’ effect, at least in the welfarist sense of the term.[23] 
 
 Some welcome the disrupting effect of automation on work, but they are typically 
radicals who long for a ‘postwork’ future in which we have abandoned the ideological 
  
glorification the work ethic.[36] There is little solace in this radical posture for the 
evaluative conservative who sees the current system as a source of value, one to which 
they have grown attached. The person who has worked all their lives in a profession like 
law and developed mastery over a certain set of valuable skills (e.g. legal research; 
document review; brief writing) is going to lose that source of value if all those skills 
can be automated. Even if the promised postwork future would be better for this person, 
the evaluative conservative would insist that the person is axiologically warranted in 
trying to hold onto what they current have. Others suggest that a basic income guarantee 
could address some of the problems posed by technological unemployment.[27, 28, 37] 
It would enable everyone to receive an income irrespective of their ability or 
willingness to work. This means some of the consumption-related value of work could 
be conserved. But the problem with this is that the non-monetary values that attach to 
work would not. So a basic income may partly address the concerns of the evaluative 
conservative, but not all of them. Biomedical enhancement, on other hand, is more 
hopeful. Biomedical enhancements could allow human beings to ‘keep pace’ with their 
automated rivals, either through the direct augmentation of biological systems, or 
through the grafting in of prosthetic devices. Biomedically enhanced humans could 
continue to be valued contributors to the economic system. This could help to conserve 
work as a source of value.5  
  
 Consider a simple example. A surgeon has dedicated their lives to mastering a set 
of highly precise motor skills and marrying that to a deep understanding of how the 
human body works. Their work is individually meaningful and socially valuable. 
Unfortunately, the hospital has decided to invest in robotic surgeons that are more 
precise, more efficient, less prone to fatigue and automatically updated with the latest 
medical knowledge. The surgeon is told that their work is no longer needed. The result 
might be improved medical outcomes for the hospital, but a significant loss in meaning 
and value for the surgeon whose identity is so closely tied to their competence at work. 
This outcome could have been avoided if the hospital (or whichever relevant authority) 
prioritized biomedical enhancement of human surgeons over investment in robotic 
surgeons. Human surgeons could be augmented with enhancing drugs that make their 
hands steadier, improve their concentration, reduce their fatigue and enable them to 
better absorb the latest medical knowledge. At least in principle, there was a way to 
                                                            
5 Loi [23] p 209 makes a similar observation in his discussion of technological unemployment, arguing 
that biomedical enhancement could used to counterbalance the disenhancing effect of workplace 
automation. 
  
achieve better outcomes whilst still conserving the value of work to the surgeon. There 
were choices to be made about investment and prioritization of technological innovation 
that could have retained our existing work-related evaluative equilibrium.6 
 
 The second threat arises in the political sphere. Most Western societies are 
characterised by liberal democratic systems of governance. These systems of 
governance are undergirded by the commitment to moral equality and individual 
autonomy.[38] These commitments imply that governance structures are illegitimate 
unless they satisfy certain conditions.[38, 39] These legitimacy conditions come in two 
major flavours: instrumentalist and proceduralist. Instrumentalist legitimacy conditions 
justify governance structures in terms of their outputs, i.e. do they maximise some value 
beloved by the polity (less crime, more healthcare, more economic growth, longer lives, 
better education etc.)? Proceduralist legitimacy conditions justify governance structures 
in terms of the processes they use to produce their outputs, i.e. are these processes 
inclusive, participative, comprehensible, publicly accessible and so forth? Although 
some favour purely instrumentalist or proceduralist approaches to legitimation, most 
accept that a mix of instrumentalist and proceduralist conditions must be satisfied.  
 
 But here’s the rub: algorithmic and automated decision-making is increasingly 
being used by political governance systems.[40-42] These systems limit or obviate the 
need for human input and oversight of decision-making. Algorithms can collect and 
organize decision-relevant information, draw inferences from that information, and use 
it to make important political, legal and bureaucratic decisions. Dormehl[32] gives the 
example of a facial recognition algorithm used by the Massachusetts Registry of Motor 
Vehicles to detect probable false identities in its database of driver ID photographs 
(157-8). Once the system found a suspiciously-similar match, an automatic letter was 
issued cancelling the driver’s licence. Similar systems are being used to detect potential 
terrorist threats and likely tax cheats. And the number of such systems is rapidly 
growing.[43] 
 
  Their introduction is often defended on the grounds that they are more accurate, 
less costly, and more efficient than traditional bureaucratic systems.[32, 44] But are 
                                                            
6 There are also important political and social choices to be made regarding who benefits most from the 
productivity gains of either enhanced or automated labour. One major concern about automated labour is 
that it increases the share of wealth that goes to owners of capital and thereby exacerbates income and 
social inequality. While biomedical enhancement of workers is unlikely to solve inequality, it may be 
considerably less worse than automation since workers can at least retain their income from work.  
  
they consequently more legitimate? This is highly debateable. They may be more 
instrumentally legitimate insofar as they can facilitate better outcomes, but their 
procedural virtues are dubious. These systems typically rely on mass surveillance, 
largescale data-mining operations, and machine-learning technologies. In addition to the 
privacy-related concerns that these systems raise, they also raise considerable 
transparency, comprehensibility and accessibility concerns. The highly technical nature 
of the systems makes them comprehensible to a relatively limited set of human elites. 
And more advanced versions of these systems are often impenetrable to even these 
elites, due to both the opacity of the technology, and the fact that they are woven into 
complex ecosystems of pre-existing algorithms.[45, 46] The result is that the increased 
use of algorithmic and automated systems of governance poses a threat to the 
procedural legitimacy of our political system, which again constitutes a central part of 
our evaluative equilibrium.  
 
 The threat can be explained by way of analogy. A long-standing concern in 
political theory is with the attractiveness of non-democratic governance. Some (e.g. 
Plato and JS Mill) have argued that human epistemic elites (i.e. humans with greater 
cognitive ability, education, technical knowledge and so forth) should be given more 
decision-making power. Others have challenged this on the grounds that deferring to 
human epistemic elites often means blocking ordinary people from participating in the 
decisions that affect their lives, and/or failing to explain and justify those decisions to 
them. The result is something Estlund calls the threat of ‘epistocracy’ – a threat that 
undermines participative democratic governance.[47] The growth of algorithmic 
governance gives rise to a similar threat: humans create algorithmic systems in the 
belief that they can gather and make sense of more information than humans ever could. 
They start deferring to the algorithms for epistemic reasons. This may be unproblematic 
at first, but as the algorithmic systems become more complex, comprehensive and 
opaque, the humans may end up deferring to them in blind faith. The result is something 
like a threat of ‘algocracy’ – humans are blocked from participating in and 
understanding the algorithmic decisions that affect their lives.[42]  
 
 The conservative impulse might be to address this problem by limiting, banning 
and regulating the use of such systems. This may have some utility, but one shouldn’t 
underestimate the difficulties. There are already numerous ‘secrecy’ laws that facilitate 
the construction and opacity of these systems, and these would have to be dismantled at 
  
national and supranational levels. Furthermore, the technologies that allow for this are 
already woven into our everyday lives and so it makes sense for similarly structured 
governance systems to be built on top of them. There are also powerful ideological 
forces behind their creation and use.[48] Resistance and regulation may be futile in this 
domain. Could biomedical enhancement help? There are reasons to think that it could. 
First, biomedical enhancements could help to improve the capacities and efficiencies of 
human workers within governance systems, thereby countermanding some of the drive 
towards their replacement. Imagine that instead of relying on an automated facial 
recognition algorithm, the registry of motor vehicles encouraged its employees to adopt 
neural prosthetics that could augment their visual acuity and speed, and enable them to 
see the suspiciously similar matches. Second, biomedical enhancements that are more 
widely distributed could help to improve the capacities of all people affected by those 
governance systems. For instance, widespread cognitive enhancement, in conjunction 
with educational programmes, could enable people to better understand and participate 
in an increasingly automated governance system. The pharmacological enhancements 
could focus on core capacities and competencies – concentration, memory retrieval, 
basic reasoning capacities – and the education programme could focus on explaining the 
mechanics of automated governance. This would help to combat some of the 
proceduralist concerns raised in the previous paragraphs. These biomedical 
enhancements could work in tandem with regulatory interventions that give people the 
right to challenge and access these systems, thereby doing a better job conserving this 
part of the current evaluative equilibrium. So the claim here is not that biomedical 
enhancements solve the problem on their own, but rather that they could be an essential 
piece of the puzzle: without enhanced reasoning capacities people will be overwhelmed 
and poorly disposed towards acquiring the requisite knowledge that will allow them to 
conserve the value of participative democratic governance. 
 
 The final threat arises in the personal sphere, i.e. the day-to-day activities that 
make up our lives. There is a general desire to live a ‘good life’, where this can be 
understood as a life of meaning and virtue. Work plays a part in this conception of the 
good life but obviously work itself is not the be-all and end-all of the well-lived life. We 
also seek meaning and virtue in our family lives, leisure pursuits, unpaid work, 
charitable endeavours, sporting activities and so on. In these pursuits, a sense of 
personal achievement is often seen as central to whether they provide meaning or 
not.[49, 50] The longing for achievement is part of the current evaluative equilibrium: 
  
achievement is a source of value and something valued by us in and of itself. But 
achievement is only really made possible when there is an appropriate causal-mental 
link between what an individual does and the outcome they are trying to achieve. The 
problem is that the rise of AI and robotics threatens to sever that link. This happens 
through the rise of personalised automation. It is already obvious that individuals rely 
on assistive software technologies in their everyday lives, for instance, software 
mapping technologies and personal digital assistants. There is also the emerging field of 
personal robotics, which includes robots that mow the lawn, vacuum the floors, cook 
your meals and so on. Reliance on such technologies can be expected to grow. Not only 
does this threaten to sever the link necessary for personal achievement, it is also gives 
rise to a disenhancing effect on personal cognitive capacity.[51] Several studies 
demonstrate that the use of assistive software can lead to the degeneration of the 
cognitive capacities needed to perform certain mental and physical tasks.[52-54] This 
can occur even if there is a residual causal-mental link between what the individual does 
and the outcome in the world, provided that residual link is mediated through some 
degenerating technology. 
 
 This threat to the evaluative equilibrium may be less severe than the previous two. 
Personalised automation has its merits and demerits; it all depends on how it is used. 
Some people could use it wisely to outsource mundane or limiting activities and spend 
the rest of their time on activities that really do contribute to the good life. But we 
should be cautious in our optimism. People can be lazy and prone to biases that cause 
them to do things that are counterproductive to their own well-being. Overreliance on 
personalised automation could exacerbate these tendencies. This will be particularly 
true if the technology promises to do a better job of achieving the relevant outcome than 
a human ever could or if it supplies addictive hedonic rewards that distract us from 
those achievements.7 Biomedical enhancement can, once again, be part of the 
conservative solution to these problems. First, mood enhancers and cognitive enhancers 
could be adopted to mitigate or limit the biases that drive overreliance on personalised 
automation. And second, it could be used to enhance human capacities so that that there 
is no need to turn to those technologies for better outcomes. 
                                                            
7 An extreme example would be the vision of the future depicted in the Pixar movie Wall-E. The 
imagined future consists of innumerable robots that perform routine tasks and supply humans with all 
their needs and pleasures. The humans are reduced to passive, overweight beings, moving about on 
automated chairs, receiving a constant and addictive supply of sugary foods and light entertainment. I 
suspect this possible future is highly unlikely to materialize, but its exaggeration of the human 
susceptibility to short term rewards is instructive. 
  
 
 In summary: work, legitimate governance and personal achievement are 
prominent features of our current evaluative equilibrium; developments in AI, robotics 
and information technology threaten those features; but biomedical enhancements could 
be used to conserve them. There is empirical uncertainty within this argument but 
wariness in the face of an uncertain future is part and parcel of the conservative position 
favoured in this article. The argument makes a strong claim about the conservative 
power of biomedical enhancement. The features of our evaluative equilibrium that have 
been singled out by the argument are not mere sideshows. They are central to our 
current economic, political and social institutions. Furthermore, the threats posed by the 
automating technologies are not insignificant. The erosion of work, comprehensible 
governance, or personal achievement individually constitute significant disruptions to 
our evaluative equilibrium. When two or more of them combine, the effect is truly 
radical. The evaluative conservative should be strongly committed to minimising such 
disruption and biomedical enhancement may, according to the arguments proferred 
above, be the most viable form of conservation. 
 
 5. Objections and Replies 
 I close by considering six objections to this argument. 
 
 The first objection is: why can’t the conservative adopt a strategy of general 
resistance to technological development? My argument supposes that they must accept 
the reality of workplace automation, algorithmic outsourcing in government, and 
increased infiltration of AI and robotic assistance into everyday life. Surely it is possible 
and preferable to resist those developments and resist biomedical enhancement as well?  
 
 There is some merit to this criticism. It probably would be ideal, from the 
conservative’s perspective, to resist all the developments since that would conserve 
more of the existing evaluative equilibrium. The question is whether this is feasible. 
The conservative may have to pick and choose their battles. When discussing the rise of 
algorithmic governance in the previous section, I suggested that it might be difficult to 
resist this phenomenon due to the fact that: (i) the underlying technologies are woven 
into the fabric of everyday life; (ii) there are laws and policies in place that facilitate and 
encourage their development; and (iii) there are powerful ideological forces driving 
  
their adoption. The same holds in the case of workplace automation. Indeed, automation 
in work is deeply engrained into the incentive structure of capitalism. It is less true in 
the personal sphere but automation is becoming increasingly normalised there too and 
many of same forces underlying the drive towards workplace automation are behind the 
push towards personal automation. The question then becomes whether it is possible to 
resist the push towards automation across all three domains. It may be, but one 
advantage of biomedical enhancement is that it can facilitate conservation of values 
across all three domains at the same time. This is because success for humans across all 
three domains is dependent on general human intelligence and ability, and biomedical 
enhancement tends to target generic cognitive, emotional and perceptual capacities that 
are relevant to value conservation across all three domains. Until we develop 
generalized machine intelligence, the technologies that pose a threat to all three domains 
will be diverse and disparate.  
 
 The second objection is that even if biomedical enhancements preserve the values 
mentioned above, couldn’t it also be the case that they change other values that the 
conservative favours? Sandel’s giftedness argument illustrates the objection.[55] He 
argues that one prominent and important feature of our existing evaluative equilibrium 
is our gratitude for the gifted aspects of our lives. That is to say: gratitude for the fact 
that many good things happen to us because of biological and sociological factors that 
are beyond our control. This has a number of positive consequences in terms of 
empathy and social solidarity.[14] He worries that if we continue to pursue biomedical 
enhancement we will lose this element of our evaluative equilibrium because everything 
will become contingent and manipulable. Similarly, there are those who worry that 
biomedically enhanced personal achievement is less valuable because it is less 
authentic. 
 
 Three things can be said in response to this. First, these forms of conservative 
argument are often unpersuasive on their own merits. ‘Authenticity’ can be parsed in 
different ways, sometimes as a fear about how biomedical enhancements bypass 
personal effort, other times as a fear about disconnection from the authentic self. But 
there is no reason why biomedical enhancements have to eliminate effort: augmenting a 
capacity does not mean you stop using it in an effortful way.[56] Nor is it clear why it 
would lead to disconnection from the authentic self: if the decision to enhance is 
undertaken with appropriate self-reflection then it can be an expression of the authentic 
  
self. Second, biomedical enhancements could be prioritized and selected on the basis 
that they help to conserve the values identified in these arguments. For instance, 
feelings of gratitude, empathy and solidarity are things that can be conserved and 
enhanced through various pharmacological and behavioural interventions.[62] Finally, 
even if this is all wrong, part of the motivation behind the argument in this article is that 
the evaluative conservative may sometimes face important tradeoffs when it comes to 
the conservation of value. The question then becomes whether the threat to something 
like gratitude and authenticity outweighs the three threats I have identified. 
 
 A third objection holds that there is a paradox at the heart of my argument. My 
claim is that externalised automation technologies pose a series of threats to our current 
evaluative equilibrium. This is because these technologies take over the performance of 
tasks traditionally performed by humans. But would things really be any better if 
(enhanced) humans continued to perform those tasks? It is well-known that the routine 
performance of a task by a human gives rise to internal automaticity, i.e. the task is 
initially learned and performed through conscious mental representations, but as the 
human gets better it transfers to subconscious systems within the human body. This is 
particularly true for many tasks performed at work, as well as certain hobbies and skills. 
If everything ends up automated in the end (either through external automation or 
internal automaticity) what difference does it make whether it is mediated through the 
human body? 
 
 Two responses seem apposite. First, this objection has a limited scope. While it is 
true that many human tasks end up being internally automatised, it is not always true. 
Certain cognitive tasks are always performed through conscious mental representations 
and their continued conscious representation may be part of what makes them valuable. 
For instance, the conscious understanding of political and bureaucratic decision-making 
may be essential to their legitimacy -- nothing less will do. Second, the conservative 
should be comfortable with the notion that there is something preferable about the 
current system (even we cannot pinpoint exactly what it is), whereby tasks end up 
automatised through the mediation of the human mind, as compared to a potential 
system whereby the automation is fully external.  
 
 The fourth objection is similar and makes use of the extended mind hypothesis 
(EMH) to argue that external and internal enhancements are ethically on a par.[57-59] 
  
As Levy puts it: ‘alterations of external props used for thinking are (ceteris paribus) 
ethically on a par with alterations of the brain”.8  Adopting this, one might argue there is 
no principled difference between enhancements internal to the human body and 
externalised automating technologies, provided the combined internal and external 
system reaches the same outcome.  
 
 But the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause in this principle is all important.  There does seem 
to be a qualitative difference between, say, a calculation performed in the mind and with 
the help of a calculator. The former seems to be more of a personal achievement than 
the latter. This points to a general problem with the use of the EMH in this debate. Even 
if you are persuaded that a functionalist account of the mind lends support to the EMH, 
you can still acknowledge that there are sufficient, relevant differences between mental 
processes realised internally (i.e. using biological systems) and those that are realised 
using a combination of internal and external mechanisms. These differences can include 
the phenomenology of the underlying mental activity, as well as how the activity gets 
dynamically integrated into the cognitive framework the individual uses to perceive and 
respond to the world.[60, 61] These differences are grist for the conservative mill. We 
should hold onto values we know attach to predominantly internalised activity, rather 
than the (potentially different) values that attach to predominantly externalised ones. 
 
 The fifth objection tries to argue that my conservative argument is flawed because 
it ignores the risks and impracticalities that arise from biomedical forms of 
enhancement. Biomedical enhancement involves interventions that operate on 
biological systems. But the human body is a complex, evolved system. Tinkering with it 
through pharmacological or prosthetic enhancements could be risky. Agar puts the point 
nicely by noting that all proponents of internal biomedical enhancement face an 
integration problem,[13] whereas proponents of externalisation can ‘cleverly avail 
themselves of efficiencies enabled by biological design’ (p. 47). This seems to make 
externalisation the conservatively superior option. 
 
 There are several things to be said in response. First, when Agar describes the 
integration problem he assumes that the externalisation has an enhancing effect on 
individual humans. I have already argued that this may not be true. Widespread 
                                                            
8 Levy [59] quoted in DeMarco and Ford [60] at 318. This is the strong version of the EPP. A weaker 
version states that they are equivalent insofar as the same ethical reasons apply to internal and external 
forms of enhancement. 
  
externalisation could have severe disenhancing effects by making individuals more 
likely to be worse off relative to the current status quo (e.g. through unemployment) or 
through the atrophying of cognitive capacities. There are, no doubt, risks inherent in the 
use of biomedical enhancements that do not arise in the case of externalisation. But that 
doesn’t make externalisation the preferable option. The whole point of the argument I 
have just defended is that externalisation poses significant risks to our current 
evaluative equilibrium and it is difficult to mitigate those risks without appealing to 
some degree of biomedical enhancement. Furthermore, the argument I am making is not 
that biomedical enhancement should be pursued at all costs. It is simply that biomedical 
enhancement should be prioritised given its conservative potential. 
 
 The final objection is that my argument is unrealistic due to the competing 
timelines for technological progress. Development of automating technologies is rapid 
and possibly exponential; development of biomedical enhancements seems to be much 
slower. We have several putative biomedical enhancers available today, but their effects 
are rather modest. We could pump more money into their research and development, 
but there is no guarantee of success. External automating technologies may win the race 
and we may lose much of our current evaluative equilibrium regardless of our efforts. 
 
 My response to this is simple: this may indeed be true, but it only serves to 
strengthen the argument I am making. If the risk to our evaluative equilibrium really is 
this great, then evaluative conservatives should be even more wedded to prioritising the 
proposed solution. 9 
 
 
 5. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, despite the widespread belief that conservative moral principles 
are opposed to human enhancement, there are in fact strong reasons to think that human 
enhancement has conservative potential. This is because technological development 
                                                            
9 A reviewer worries that the argument implies that individuals – through their decisions to enhance or 
not – rather than collective institutions bear responsibility for conserving our evaluative equilibrium. 
They noted that this could be problematic if individuals lacked the means to avail of such interventions or 
were driven by their social context to avail of them in problematic ways (e.g. the poor worker who uses 
biomedical enhancements to resist bad working conditions but ignores side effects). But this is not a 
necessary implication of the argument. Although the ultimate target of enhancement is the individual, 
there is no reason why the enhancements themselves cannot be developed and distributed through 
collective institutions, nor why the individual must bear responsibility for the failure to enhance, or for 
the negative side effects of enhancement. For a longer discussion see Danaher [62] 
  
does not take place in a vacuum. One cannot consider the effects of biomedical 
enhancement technology in isolation from other trends in technological progress. When 
this is done, it becomes apparent that AI, robotics and information technology are 
developing at a rapid pace and their widespread deployment could undermine much of 
our current evaluative equilibrium. Biomedical enhancement may be necessary, not 
merely desirable, if we are to maintain that equilibrium. 
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